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Abstract 
We analyze the economic forces underlying cross-border Mergers and Acquistions 
(M&As) using a large bilateral panel data set. The frequent occurrence of "zero" 
observations provides essential information on the structure of M&A flows, which we 
model empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the fist stage, an observation is 
either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the (potentially) Active 
Group using a logit model. At the second stage, the size of M&A flows in the Active 
Group is modeled using a gravity-type negative binomial model. We find that: (i) 
market size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is more important for trade flows than 
for cross-border M&As, (ii) market development (per capita GDP) is more important 
for cross-border M&As than for trade flows, (iii) for M&As, the target’s market, both 
in size and development, is more important than the acquirer’s market, and (iv) the 
impact of distance is larger on trade flows than for M&As. Financial openness is a 
prerequisite for becoming active in M&As and positively influences the size of M&A 
flows. Our estimates on the direction, size, and significance of the main variables are 
robust for alternative specifications, incorporating lagged stock market value, black 
market premium, real interest rates, transparency, and exchange rate variability. 
Finally, we provide additional support and extend the recent results of Blonigen et al. 
(2007) on outside-market potential and of Bergstrand and Egger (2007) on Rest of 
World GDP. 
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1 Introduction 
According to UNCTAD (World Investment Report, 2007) global Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) flows rose by 38 per cent in 2006 to $1,306 billion (reaching record 
levels for the developing countries). In the same year, cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As) rose by 23 per cent to $880 billion, thus accounting for 67.4 per 
cent of all FDI.1 The predominant role of M&As in FDI has received considerable 
attention in the literature over the past couple of years (see below). Our main 
contributions in this paper are six-fold. First, we extend the important work of di 
Giovanni (2005) by focusing on the number of bilateral cross-border M&As, covering 
virtually all countries in the world over a 20 year period. Second, we take full account 
of the specific structure of M&A flows, in which “zero” observations (country i does 
not acquire any firm in country j in a given year) occur frequently for two reasons, 
namely either as the equilibrium outcome for an active country pair or because the 
country pair is not active in the global M&A game. Based on theoretical 
considerations (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2007, or Bergstrand and Egger, 
2007) we model this empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the fist stage, an 
observation is either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the 
(potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At the second stage, the size of M&A 
flows in the Active Group is modeled using a gravity-type negative binomial model. 
Third, we empirically characterize global M&A flows and compare with the similar 
characteristics of trade flows. We discuss how our findings can help explain the 
differences in the global distribution of M&As compared to trade flows. Fourth, we 
show that financial openness is both a prerequisite for becoming active in global 
M&As and positively influences the size of M&A flows. Fifth, we analyze the 
robustness of our results on the direction, size, and significance of the economic 
impact of the main variables relative to alternative specifications, incorporating 
lagged stock market value, black market premium, real interest rates, transparency, 
and exchange rate variability. Sixth, and finally, we extend and provide additional 
support for the recent results on FDI flows of Blonigen et al. (2007) on outside-
market potential and of  Bergstrand and Egger (2007) on Rest of World GDP. 
 
                                                 
1 Hijzen, Görg, and Manchin (2008, p. 852) note that estimates of the share of M&As in global FDI 
range from 50 percent to 90 percent, depending on the source. The share also fluctuates from year to 
year: it was about 78 percent in 1999 (World Investment Report 2000). 
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Figure 1 Global regional connections 
a. Cross-border M&As; # of deals, percent of total, 2000-2005     
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b. International trade flows; percent of total flows 
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Panel b source: van Marrewijk (2002, 2007) 
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The World Bank identifies seven global regions, namely (i) East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP; including China and Indonesia), (ii) (East) Europe and Central Asia (ECA; 
including Russia and Turkey), (iii) Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC; including 
Brazil and Mexico), (iv) Middle East and North Africa (MNA; including Egypt), (v) 
South Asia (SAS; including India), (vi) Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA; including Nigeria 
and South Africa), and (vii) the high-income countries. To characterize the global 
distribution of cross-border M&As, we subdivide the group of high-income countries 
into three subgroups, namely North America (NAm), Western Europe (EUR), and 
AustralAsia (AAs, including Japan and Australia), leading to a total of nine regions. 
 
Figure 1a shows the  the inter- and intra-regional cross-border M&A connections for 
the period 2000-2005 for the number of deals (see Table B.2 in the appendix for 
details, also regarding the value of deals). Only 22 of the 81 different connections are 
shown in Figure 1a as the other 59 are rounded to 0 per cent. First, we note that by far 
the largest M&A flows are within and between Western Europe and North America, 
accounting for almost 60 per cent of all cross-border M&A activity. These regions 
have large markets, with high income per capita, and are relatively close-by. Second, 
we note that there are also connections from there to the other high income region 
(AustralAsia). Third, we note that there is a regional connection between high income 
regions and their close-by neighbours (Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia 
and Pacific). Fourth, most of the developing world (Sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia, 
and the Middle East & North Africa) is hardly active at all in the global M&A game.  
 
The observations above for M&As are similar to those for international trade flows, 
which are well-explained empirically by ‘gravity-type’ equations. For comparison, we 
depict the trade connections in Figure 1b to show that the same four observations 
hold, although the role of Western Europe and North America is more dominant for 
M&As than for trade flows, and vice versa for the role of AustralAsia. The objective 
of this paper is to empirically explain the global distribution of cross-border M&As 
and to better understand the differences between M&A flows and trade flows as 
depicted in panels a and b of Figure 1. Inspired by the recent developments in gravity 
analysis for trade flows, our methodology will take full account of zero-flows as 
containing useful information by effectively combining the estimation procedures of 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007).  
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Table 1 Some FDI gravity studies 
Author(s) Study Period 
Eaton and Tamura 
(1994) 
Japanese and U.S. bilateral trade flows and 
FDI positions for around 100 countries 
1985–1990 
Brainard (1997) 
 
Outward activity (sales and exports) and 
inward activity (sales and imports) relative to 
US; 63 tradeable sectors, 27 countries 
1989  
cross-section 
Carr, Markusen, and 
Maskus (2001) 
Sales of foreign affiliates, bilateral data of 36 
countries with the US 
1986-1994 
Blonigen and Davies 
(2004) 
Estimate the impact of bilateral tax treaties 
using both US inbound and outbound FDI 
1980–1999 
Di Giovanni (2005) Bilateral cross-border M&As, 200+ countries 1990-1999 
Blonigen et al (2005) US Inbound FDI from 20 developed 
economies 
1980-2000 
Blonigen et al (2007) US outbound FDI into top 40 destinations 1983-1998 
Bergstrand and Egger 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI stocks, 17 OECD countries 1990-2000 
Hijzen et al. (2008) Bi-annual bilateral cross-border M&As, 19 
merchandise sectors, 23 OECD countries 
1990-2001 
This study Bilateral cross-border M&As, 200+ countries 1986-2005 
 
Inspired by the similarities depicted in Figure 1 as well as the long tradition and 
empirical success of gravity-type studies on trade flows (see section 4), the recent 
FDI/M&A literature has turned attention to gravity-type specifications, see Table 1. 
Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, p. 32) conclude: “the cross-country pattern of FDI 
is quite well approximated by the ‘gravity’ relationship,” while Blonigen et al. (2007, p. 
1309) note that: “a ‘‘gravity’’ specification .. is arguably the most widely used empirical 
specification of FDI.” As indicated in Table 1, for various data-related reasons most 
studies focus on american multinationals, activities relative to the USA, or FDI for the 
major developed economies (OECD). The estimates are usually based on FDI stocks 
or sales of foreign affiliates, not on flows. This makes direct comparison of estimated 
elasticities, for example, troublesome. Our approach is most closely related to the 
work of di Giovanni (2005), who analyzes the values of cross-border M&A flows. 
The methodology is slightly different as he focuses on positive values after correcting 
for censoring bias using a Tobit model. Instead, we focus on the number of deals 
(with some attention for their value as well) for an extended period, including zero 
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observations in a two-stage zero-inflated logit-negative binomial model, see section 4. 
The first-stage results, determining whether an observation is active or not in global 
M&As, is crucial for understanding the pattern of M&As depicted in Figure 1a. 
 
Section 2 discusses the motivation and theoretical background. Section 3 provides 
data sources and a description of the data. Section 4 explains the empirical procedure 
used. Section 5 gives the main results and discusses the characterization of global 
M&A flows (thus explaining the first part of the title of the paper). Section 6 
investigates robustness and various alternatives. Section 7 extends recent work on 
surrounding-market potential and rest of world GDP. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Motivation and theoretical background 
The extent of financial market liberalization around the world has increased 
significantly during throughout the last few decades, driven by investment flows 
seeking higher returns and risk diversification (Agenor 2001). As show by the World 
Bank (2001), many developing and transition economies have moved away from 
regimes of financial repression, by for example, removing restrictions on financial 
transactions. This removal of restrictions has been accompanied by significant 
increases in private capital flows to developing countries (see IMF, 2007). As has 
been discussed on many occasions throughout the literature, access to world capital 
markets allows countries to borrow in order to smooth consumption, while the 
potential growth and welfare gains resulting from international risk sharing can be 
large (Obstfeld, 1994). In this light, FDI flows can also have significant indirect long-
run effects. As emphasized by Berthélemy and Demurger (2000), Borensztein et al. 
(1998), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), FDI may smooth the transfer “know-
how” (e.g. managerial and/or technological). In addition, as suggested by Markusen 
and Venables (1999), although the increased degree of competition in the product and 
factor markets stimulated by FDI may tend to reduce profits of local firms, spill-over 
effects may reduce costs, raise profits, and encourage domestic investment.  
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Table 2 World distribution of FDI 
a. FDI net inflows (% of GDP) 
 1980-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 1980-2004
World 0.86 3.32 3.58 2.65 1.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.07 0.72 2.61 2.54 1.28 
South Asia 0.09 0.23 0.68 0.86 0.39 
M. East & N. Africa 0.46 0.88 0.55 1.04 0.68 
L. America & Caribbean 0.8 1.17 3.26 3.2 1.84 
EMU – Eur. Mon. Union 0.54 0.98 2.19 5.07 1.86 
Europe & Central Asia 0.07 0.49 2.31 3.09 1.24 
East Asia & Pacific 0.74 2.89 3.81 2.64 2.16 
USA 0.77 0.6 1.68 1.45 1.05 
b. FDI as  percent of fixed capital formation 
 1980-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 1980-2004
World 2.63 3.67 8.96 13.11 5.91 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.18 4.05 11.01 16.1 7.11 
South Asia 0.43 1.06 3.12 3.71 1.75 
M. East & N. Africa 1.81 2.81 2.02 3.86 2.46 
L. America & Caribbean 3.69 6 16.2 16.58 9.23 
EMU – Eur. Mon. Union 2.45 4.51 10.6 24.44 8.89 
Europe & Central Asia N/A 1.87 10.68 15.18 8.68 
East Asia & Pacific 2.67 8.94 11.99 8.27 6.91 
USA 4.01 3.53 8.85 8.22 5.62 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) 
 
A number of papers have looked at the FDI-growth nexus, with inconclusive results 
(see for example Durham, 2004; Li and Liu, 2005). However, there is growing 
consensus that FDI is beneficial when compared to other types of capital inflows, 
such as portfolio investment or syndicated bank loans. Additional research has aimed 
at identifying other features “unique” to FDI, such as its relative permanence or the 
positive externalities it generates (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Fernandez-Arias 
and Montiel, 1996; Sarno and Taylor, 1999). Most countries vigorously pursue 
policies aimed at encouraging FDI inflows. However, limited empirical work has 
been done to examine the impact of financial openness on FDI inflows, and especially 
on cross-border M&As. Table 2 presents trends in FDI inflows relative to output and 
as a percentage of fixed capital formation. FDI has become more important (using 
both measures) throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with current levels in various regions 
still below the peak in 1995-1999. Many economists have noted that FDI grows faster 
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than merchandise trade (e.g. Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004), implying the need 
to go beyond the OLI-categorization scheme (Dunning, 1993) to understand these 
developments in a micro-economic model. 
 
Cross-border M&As are the largest component of FDI, the remainder being greenfield 
investments. The main difference between these two forms of investments is that in an 
M&A "control of assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the 
former becoming an affiliate of the latter" (UNCTAD, 2000). Two main motives are 
identified to explain M&As: (i) a market seeking or strategic motive and (ii) an 
efficiency motive (i.e. a factor cost motive). An explanation of cross-border M&As 
also has to explain the cross-border part of the deals. Neary's (2003) General 
Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model avoids some of the standard drawbacks of 
modeling oligopolistic markets, while simultaneously allowing for strategic 
interaction between firms. Building on this, Neary (2007) takes the standard 
explanations for M&As one step further by combining general-equilibrium trade 
theory with imperfect markets and strategic behavior between firms, leading to 
merger waves. The model also leads to other hypotheses, for example since firms with 
a cost advantage have an incentive to merge or acquire a weaker firm. If these cost 
differences are based economy-wide, there is a connection between comparative 
advantage and M&As, as found indeed by Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk 
(2008). A different line of research in international economics seeks to understand the 
conditions under which firms decide to locate (part of) their production abroad, that 
is, through an off-shoring decision (Barba Navaretti amd Venables, 2004; Helpman, 
2006). When firms decide to off-shore, some firms do so under the FDI umbrella, 
while other firms go for outsourcing. The role of cross-border M&As in this literature 
is largely ignored. 
 
What drives international capital flows and what explicates their cyclicality is a 
question of utmost importance for both academics and policymakers. Early 
contributions to this literature analyzed "pull" and "push" factors in total capital flows 
(Agénor, 1998), stressing the important role of U.S. interest rates as a "push" factor 
(Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Calvo et al., 1996). A more recent strand of 
literature has focused on the push and pull factors of specific types of capital, namely 
portfolio equity (Griffin et al., 2004), and FDI (Albuquerque et al., 2005). Evenett 
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(2004) presents evidence that the value of American outward M&A depends on the 
distance from the United States, the recipient’s gross domestic product, corporate tax 
rate, and average tariff rate, and whether or not the recipient was once a British 
colony. Blomstroem et al. (2000) examine the choice of Swedish multinationals to 
initiate affiliate activities abroad. They relate the choice between greenfield 
investment or acquisition to characteristics of the multinational and of the host 
country. Feliciano and Lipsey (2002) examine inward FDI in the United States for 50 
sectors over the period 1980-1990. They find, for example, that a strong U.S. dollar 
discourages takeovers whereas the exchange rate is not significantly related to foreign 
investment in new establishments. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that firms in 
countries with weak investor protection are more likely to be acquired, whereas 
buyers are more likely to be from countries with relatively strong investor protection.  
 
3 Data  
Appendix A gives an overview of the sources and variables we use. Our analysis of 
cross-border M&As is based on Thomson's Global Mergers and Acquisitions 
database, the best and most extensive data source for M&As to date. Thompson 
gathers information on M&As exceeding one million US dollars.2 The data set begins 
in 1979 but the initial focus was on American M&As, implying that systematic M&A 
data for almost all countries is available since around 1986. Therefore, in analyzing 
the data we focus on the period 1986 – 2005. We collected information on all 
completed / unconditional cross-border M&As with a deal value of at least $10 
million, which provided us with 27,118 cross-border M&As, see Table 3. There is 
usually no or only a very short time difference between the date of announcement of a 
M&A deal and the date the deal is effective The announced date is the same as the 
effective date for about 38 per cent of the M&A deals, and on average the difference 
between these two dates is 0.18 years (Brakman, Garretsen, van Marrewijk, 2007).3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Its main sources of information are financial newspapers and specialized agencies, like Reuters. 
3 We therefore used the effecttive date for classifying the M&A deals over time. 
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Table 3 Cross-border M&A data, 1986-2005 
a. Descriptive statistics; value, constant 2005 million $  
Mean 292.1 Kurtosis 7,731 
Median 61.5 Skewness 71.5 
St. Deviation 1,887 Minimum 10.0 
Observations 27,118 Maximum 225,454 
b. Most active countries; # of deals 
Most active acquirers Most active targets 
Country  # deals % Country # deals % 
United States 6,921 25.52 United States 6,218 22.93 
United Kingdom 4,576 16.87 United Kingdom 3,386 12.49 
Canada 1,600 5.10 France 1,374 5.07 
France 1,383 5.90 Canada 1,341 4.95 
Germany 1,160 4.28 Germany 1,273 4.69 
Australia 994 3.67 Australia 1,235 4.55 
Japan 956 2.33 Spain 784 2.89 
Netherlands 907 3.34 Netherlands 689 2.54 
Hong Kong 737 2.18 Italy 682 2.51 
Sweden 677 2.72 Hong Kong 613 2.26 
Sum 19,911 71.9 Sum 17,595 64.9 
 
Measured in constant 2005 dollars, the median M&A value is $61.5 million and the 
mean is $292.1 million. This indicates that the distribution is skewed, see Figure 2a. 
Table 3 also lists the ten most active acquiring and target nations, eight of which 
appear in both lists. Most active, both as acquirer and target nation, are the US and the 
UK. The top ten countries together account for about 72 percent of the acquisitions 
and 65 percent of the targets. Figure 2b depicts the evolution of all cross-border 
M&As over the last twenty years, both measured as the number of deals and the value 
of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using the US GDP deflator). Clearly, there is 
substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid increase followed by periods of 
rapid decline. Five merger waves have been identified during the 20th century, three of 
which are recent (Andrade et al., 2001). The 3rd wave took place in the late 1960-early 
1970s; the 4th wave ran from about the mid 1980s until 1990; the 5th wave started 
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around 1995 and ended in 2000 with the collapse of the "new economy". Figure 2b 
shows that a subsequent (still ongoing) 6th merger wave started around 2003. 
 
Figure 2a  Frequency distribution of cross-border M&As, 1986-2005 
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Figure 2b M&A current waves, 1986-2005 (value is dashed line) 
Cross-border M&As; # of deals (left hand scale) and 
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Substantial research has been devoted to understanding what drives U.S. domestic 
merger waves (Evenett, 2004). The literature classifies merger waves into three 
categories: neoclassical, strategic, and mis-valuation. Neoclassical theories emphasize 
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the role of deregulatory and technological shocks at the industry level (Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2002). Strategic theories (Toxvaerd, 2007), focus on the relative scarcity of 
targets with a relationship to the acquirers, while “Mis-valuation” theories focus on 
the perception of the value of the traded assets by the agents (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). Empirically, Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) and Harford (2005) argue that industry-specific shocks lead to industry waves 
(a necessary, but not sufficient condition according to Harford). Gugler et al. (2003) 
argue that merger waves do not boost efficiency but are the result of overvalued 
shares and managerial discretion. Andrade et al. (2001) show (for publicly traded US 
firms) that with each merger wave the value of the M&A deals (measured by firms' 
market capitalization) increases. Neary (2007) explains merger waves in a game-
theoretic approach, where general equilibrium conditions finally stop the wave.  
 
It has long been recognized that it is complicated to measure the extent of openness in 
capital account transactions (Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004).4 Conventional 
measures fail to account for the intensity of capital controls. IMF-based variables are 
too aggregated to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls (which can differ 
depending on the direction and type of capital flows). Moreover, it is hard to 
distinguish between de jure and de facto controls on capital transactions (Rajan, 2003; 
the private sector may circumvent capital account restrictions, Edwards, 1999). We 
rely on the financial liberalization index developed by Chinn and Ito (2002), which is 
the first principle component of four IMF binary variables.5 It measures the intensity 
of capital controls insofar as this is correlated with the existence of other restrictions 
on international transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2005). Moreover, it is widely available 
for more than 150 countries in the period 1970 through 2005. 
 
Theoretically, FDI may be a substitute or a complement to trade in goods (Mundell, 
1957; Markusen, 1997). Empirically, Figure 1 illustrates that FDI and trade are 
positively correlated.6 As empirical complementarities, one expects a negative impact 
                                                 
4 See Edison et al. (2004) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. 
5 These are binary variables created based on a set of "on-off" clarifications, which includes an 
indicator variable for the existence of multiple exchange rates (k1); restrictions on current account (k2); 
capital account transactions (k3); and a variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds (k4); where k3 is the one most often used for capital controls. 
6 See Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) who show that firms engage in both intra-industry FDI and intra-
industry trade at the same time. Markusen (1997) provides "knowledge-capital" models, which allow 
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of distance between acquirer and target on M&A flows. Information costs can also 
play a role for the investment decision of firms (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996; Martin 
and Rey, 2004; Portes and Rey, 2005). De Ménil (1999) uses distance as a proxy for 
information costs. In addition, we consider a common language, common border, and 
common colonial experience as potential factors for reducing the costs of doing 
business (all taken from the CEPII database). Indicators of market potential (GDP) 
and market development (per capita GDP) are taken from Angus Maddison (2007).7 
 
4   Empirical procedure 
We focus attention on the determinants of im , the number of bilateral cross-border 
M&As. As this is a count variable, the first empirical candidates for our estimation 
procedure are the Poisson Regression Model (PRM) and the Negative Binomial 
Regression Model (NBRM). The PRM extends the Poisson distribution by allowing 
for observed heterogeneity, that is observation i is drawn from a Poisson distribution 
with mean iμ , which is estimated from observed characteristics ix  as:8 
)exp()( βμ iiii xxmE == . The Poisson distribution imposes the restriction that the 
mean is equal to the variance, that is )var()( iiii xmxmE = . In practice, the PRM 
rarely fits in most empirical studies due to overdispersion, indicating that the variance 
exceeds the expected value. The NBRM addresses this issue by adding a parameter 
reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among observations: iii x δβμ )exp(~ = , where the 
uncorrelated disturbance term iδ  has mean 1 and is drawn from a gamma distribution. 
We thus have: )exp()~( βμ ii xE = , such that the PRM and the NBRM have the same 
mean structure. 
 
Since )exp()( βiii xxmE =  for both the PRM and the NBRM, they are examples of 
the ‘constant-elasticity’ models as discussed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) with 
respect to the gravity model popular in international trade. Pioneered empirically by 
Tinbergen (1962) and Linneman (1966), theoretical foundations are provided in a 
variety of settings, see e.g. Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), and  Anderson and 
                                                                                                                                            
for horizontal and vertical integration of firms accross countries in the presence of trade costs among 
other factors. 
7 See Table B.3 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. 
8 Taking the exponential of βix  forces iμ  to be positive.  
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van Wincoop (2003). If ijT  is the flow from country i to country j, ijD   is a measure 
of the bilateral distance between the two countries, and iY  and jY  are their respective 
income levels, a basic specification explaining the name gravity equation is: 
θβββ ijjiij DYYT /210= . If we add a disturbance term and control variables and all 
observations are positive, this equation can be estimated by log-linearizing it and 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This approach is problematic because it is not 
defined for observations with ‘zero’ flows (which are abundant in trade flows and 
occur very frequently in M&A flows), which leads to biased and inefficient estimates 
when ignored as the zeros are not randomly distributed. 
 
To overcome the zero-flow problem, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest to 
incorporate them directly in the estimation procedure simply by using the PRM 
instead of log-linearizing. The next step is to use the NBRM to take account of the 
usual overdispersion problem. Although we follow this procedure in principle, 
theoretical considerations suggest to make additional modifications. For trade flows, 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) develop a theoretical model with 
heterogeneous firms that predicts positive as well as zero trade flows in a generalized 
gravity equation. They propose a two-stage estimation procedure that uses a selection 
equation into trade partners in the first stage and a trade flow equation in the second.9 
The distinction of two different types of groups is similar in spirit to Heckman’s 
(1979) analysis of sample selection and specification error.  
 
Returning to FDI flows in general and M&As in particular, the empirical tradition to 
explain FDI flows using gravity models is more recent, less extensive, and less 
abundant (see the introduction). Unlike its trade counterpart, we are only aware of one 
theoretical foundation for the use of gravity models in FDI, provided recently by 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) in a three-factor model, who conclude (p. 281): “bilateral 
trade, FAS, and FDI flows' economic determinants should be “well-approximated” by gravity 
equations — yet not precisely the same gravity relationships.”10 In their Markusen (2002) 
– based model in which scale economies (level effects) play a key role, the trade and 
FDI flows depend on the endogenously determined distribution of national firms, 
                                                 
9 To implement their estimator, one needs to find an appropriate exclusion restriction for identification 
of the second stage equation, which can be quite difficult. 
10 FAS = Foreign Affiliate Sales. 
Countries of a feather flock together: M&As in the global economy 
14 
horizontal multinationals, and vertical multinationals. Depending on the 
circumstances, there may be no bilateral FDI flows. Similarly, in the Neary (2007) 
M&A context explaining the relationships between comparative advantage and 
merger waves, there are no M&A flows between countries unless specific 
circumstances hold, as discussed in Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2008) in 
a heterogeneous firm context.11  
 
The above discussion indicates that we should distinguish between two groups of 
observations to adequately deal with the zero-flow problem (in our M&A setting 
about 98 percent of the total number of observations). This can be done in an 
empirically flexible way by using Lambert’s (1992) zero-inflated approach.12 The 
zero-inflated model assumes that there are two latent groups of observations on cross-
border bilateral M&As. An observation in the (always 0) Passive Group has an 
outcome of 0 with a probability of 1. A country in the (potentially) Active Group 
might have a zero outcome, but there is a positive probability that there is a non-zero 
outcome. This process is developed in two stages: (i) model membership into the 
latent groups (Active or Passive) and (ii) model counts for those in the Active Group. 
 Ad (i). Latent group membership. Let iy  be a binary indicator of membership in 
the Passive Group ( pyi = ) or the Active Group ( ayi = ) for observation i. As group 
membership is not directly observable but depends on observable characteristics iz , it 
can be empirically estimated using a binary regression model, such as logit or probit. 
By definition, the count for an observation from the Passive Group is zero.  
 Ad (ii) Counts for the active group. Given that an observation is from the Active 
Group, we can model the number of M&As using a count model based on the 
observed characteristics ix .
13  
 
                                                 
11 Both countries must be active in a sector and it must be profitable to take over another firm; roughly 
translated this means differences in comparative advantage must not be too large nor too small. 
12 This avoids the difficulty of trying to find an appropriate exclusion restriction (Helpman et al, 2007). 
Alternative names for zero-inflated models are "with zeroes", "zero altered", and "hurdle" models. 
13 The characteristics xi need not be the same as the characteristics zi. Using the PRM in combination 
with stage (i) results in the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. Using the NBRM in combination with stage 
(i) results in the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model. Note that the outcome can be zero even 
though it is an observation from the Active Group. 
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Figure 4 Model framework 
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The above discussion identifies four main count models, namely PRM, NBRM, Zero-
Inflated Poisson (ZIP), and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB), which raises the 
question of empirical model selection.14 A standard Cameron and Trivedi (1986) 
procedure favours the NBRM over the PRM due to overdispersion. The latter, 
however, may also be due to excess zeros created by two separate processes – Active 
and Passive observations – as modelled above. If so, the ZIP model increases the 
conditional variance and the probability of zero counts may be sufficient to deal with 
the overdispersion problem. Alternatively, even after using two separate processes, 
there may still be overdispersion in the data for the Active Group. This problem can 
be addressed by using the ZINB model. The Vuong (1989) test can be used for 
selection of non-nested models. It provides overwhelming support in favour of ZIP 
versus PRM, in favour of ZINB versus NBRM, and (for the baseline case discussed 
below) in favour of ZINB versus ZIP. As summarized in Figure 4, the discussion 
below therefore only reports the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimates, 
using a logit binary regression model at the first stage.  
 
5 Results 
Part of our economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients below is based on the 
odds ratio and the incidence rate ratio. For the first stage of the estimation procedure, 
let )Pr(/)Pr( iiii zayzpy ==  be the odds of a passive outcome versus an active one 
in the logit model. Suppose b is the estimated coefficient for some variable, and δ  the 
standard deviation for non-dummy variables (respectively, a unit change for dummy 
variables). Then δbe  is the odds ratio, that is the expected factor change in the odds of 
                                                 
14 Six if we include the distinction between using probit and logit at the first stage of the zero inflated 
models; as the logit specification performed better we restrict attention to this possibility, which has the 
added benefit of using the odds ratio for economic interpretation. 
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a passive outcome for a δ -size change in the variable in question, holding all other 
variables constant.15 Note that the odds ratio is multiplicative, so the magnitude of 
positive and negative effects should be compared using the inverse (that is, a 50 
percent decline is comparable in magnitude to a 100 percent increase). For the second 
(negative binomial) stage of the procedure, we report )1(100 −δbe  which, similarly, 
denotes the percentage change in the expected count for a δ -size change in the 
variable in question, holding all other variables constant. In addition, at the second 
stage the estimated coefficients of the variables measured in natural logarithms can be 
interpreted as elasticities.  
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for two basic specifications and our baseline 
case. The Basic I specification ignores waves and the impact of financial openness but 
includes time fixed effects. It thus has the main gravity equation ingredients at both 
stages of the estimation procedure, namely economic size of acquirer and target (as 
measured by GDP), economic development of acquirer and target (as measured by per 
capita income), distance between acquirer and target, and the main dummy control 
variables (common language, colony, and common border). The Basic II specification 
replaces the (serially correlated) time fixed effects by wave variables. This has little 
impact on any of the estimated coefficients and the benefit of providing an economic 
interpretation for the serial correlation. Moreover, if we include time fixed effects and 
the wave variables, none of the time fixed effects are statistically significant. Since 
M&As are the main ingredients of FDI flows and there has been a long discussion on 
the impact of financial openness for the ability of countries to successfully attract FDI 
flows, the third, baseline specification analyses in detail the impact of financial 
openness for acquirer and target on the global M&A flows. As can be concluded from 
Table 4, the inclusion of the financial openness variables has relatively mild, but non-
negligible effects on the impact of the other (standard) variables of the gravity 
equation listed in the Basic I and Basic II specifications. The discussion below 
therefore restricts attention to the economic effects of the baseline specification.  
Table 4 Basic and baseline regression results, zero-inflated negative binomial 
 Basic I Basic II Baseline case st dev 
                                                 
15 In Tables 4 and B.3-4 we report )1(100 −δbe , that is the percent change in the odds, for variables 
significant at 10 percent or better. 
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a. Active Group, negative binomial [percent change expected count if significant] 
Ln(GDPacq) 0.522*** [172] 0.517*** [169] 0.480*** [160] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.631*** [236] 0.612*** [222] 0.631*** [252] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.474*** [71] 0.382*** [54] 0.489*** [77] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.741*** [131] 0.714*** [125] 0.678*** [120] 1.17 
Ln(Distij) -0.501*** [-35] -0.500*** [-35] -0.526*** [-36] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq   0.072*** [12] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar   0.062** [10] 1.61 
Wave1 (coef × 100)  0.30*** [18] 0.20*** [13] 0.63 
Wave2 (coef × 100)  0.06*** [8] 0.06*** [8] 1.24 
Common Language+ 0.511*** [67] 0.507*** [66] 0.564*** [76] 0.38 
Colony+ 0.761*** [114] 0.693*** [100] 0.79*** [120] 0.11 
Common Border+ -0.117** [-11] -0.010*** [-9] -0.115** [-11] 0.13 
b. Passive Group, logit [percent change odds ratio if significant] 
Ln(GDPacq) -0.463*** [-59] -0.460*** [-59] -0.498*** [-63] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) -0.385*** [-52] -0.403*** [-54] -0.375*** [-53] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) -1.383*** [-79] -1.382*** [-79] -1.267*** [-77] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) -0.071 -0.096 -0.062  1.17 
Ln(Distij) 0.885*** [113] 0.873*** [111] 0.889*** [113] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq   -0.148*** [-21] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar   -0.062** [-10] 1.61 
Common Language+ -1.053*** [-65] -1.014*** [-64] -1.129*** [-68] 0.38 
Colony+ -1.046*** [-65] -1.125*** [-68] -0.963*** [-62] 0.11 
Common Border+ -1.891*** [-85] -1.723*** [-82] -1.536*** [-79] 0.13 
# of observations 380,492 345,646 255,468  
Nonzero obs 5,868 5,710 5,290  
McFadden adj. R² 0.461 0.456 0.453  
Region fixed effects yes yes yes  
Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Distij = distance between i and j; 
*, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate 
ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1; basic 1 regression includes time fixed effects (no waves) 
 
Passive Group (first stage, logit) 
The bottom part of Table 4 indicates whether an observation belongs to the Passive 
Group (always 0) or the Active Group (potentially positive). The estimates can be 
interpreted as in a standard logit model, determining the probability that the 
observation should be classified in the Passive Group. With the exception of the 
target's per capita GDP (which is not significant), all included variables are important 
for the Passive Group – Active Group classification.16 We list the impact of the 
                                                 
16 The target’s per capita GDP does play an important role in determining the number of deals within 
the Active Group, see below.  
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significant variables in decreasing order of economic magnitude, first for the 
continuous variables and then for the dummy control variables.17  
 
In order of magnitude, an observation is more likely to belong to the Passive Group: 
1. The lower the acquirer’s development level as measured by GDP per capita. 
2. The smaller the acquirer’s market size as measured by total GDP. 
3. The greater the distance to a potential target country. 
4. The smaller the target’s market size as measured by total GDP. 
5. The higher the acquirer’s financial openness. 
6. The higher the target’s financial openness. 
Similarly, for the dummy control variables, in order of magnitude an observation is 
less likely to belong to the Passive Group if: 
1. The two countries share a common border. 
2. The two countries share a common language. 
3. The two countries share a colonial history. 
 
Evidently, to become active in the global M&A game it is most crucial to have a 
sufficiently high level of development as measured by per capita GDP (and/or to 
share a common border). Other important economic factors for becoming active are 
the total size of both the acquirer’s and target’s market (positively), the distance to 
potential targets (negatively), and common language or colonial history (the last two 
indicate mutual knowledge of each other's markets and therefore lower costs of 
interaction). The negative impact of distance and the positive influence of sharing a 
common border on the probability of becoming active appears to be in contrast to the 
jumping argument. Part of this argument, however, is restored when we discuss the 
size of M&A flows for the Active Group, see below. The impact of imposing 
restrictions on capital flows (exchange controls, quantitative restrictions, multiple 
exchange rates, or taxes) is detrimental to the probability of engaging in M&As, either 
as acquirer or target. The probability that an observation belongs to the Passive Group 
therefore decreases if the financial openness variable for acquirer or target increases. 
The economic importance of financial openness for acquirer and target is fairly 
                                                 
17 Recall that the magnitude of positive and negative effects should be compared using the inverse. 
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modest (a percent change in the odds ratio of -21 and -10 percent, respectively, see 
Table 4). 
 
Active Group (second stage, negative binomial) 
The top part of Table 4 indicates the size of cross-border M&As (as measured by their 
number) given that the observation belongs to the Active Group. The estimates can be 
interpreted as in a standard negative binomial model, determining the expected 
number of M&As given the observed characteristics. All estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level or stronger.  
 
In order of economic magnitude, given that an observation belongs to the Active 
Group, the expected number of M&As increases: 
1. The higher the target’s market size as measured by total GDP. 
2. The higher the acquirer’s market size as measured by total GDP. 
3. The higher the target’s development level as measured by GDP per capita. 
4. The higher the acquirer’s development level as measured by GDP per capita. 
5. The lower the distance to a potential target country. 
6. The higher the one-year lagged wave variable. 
7. The higher the acquirer’s financial openness. 
8. The higher the target’s financial openness. 
9. The higher the two-year lagged wave variable. 
Similarly, for the dummy control variables given that an observation belongs to the 
Active Group and in order of magnitude, the expected number of M&As increases if: 
1. The two countries share a colonial history. 
2. The two countries share a common language. 
3. The two countries do not share a common border. 
 
To determine the size of cross-border M&As, market access as measured by the 
target’s total GDP is by far the most important variable (a standard deviation increase 
raises the expected number of counts by 252 percent), followed by market size of the 
acquirer (indicative of the potential number of acquiring firms). Development levels 
of both acquirer and target as measured by GDP per capita are also important 
(positively), followed by the distance between acquirer and target (negatively). The 
economic impact of the financial openness and wave variables is more modest (fairly 
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low percentage changes in expected counts). For the dummy control variables, mutual 
knowledge of each other's markets (lower costs of interaction) as measured by a 
common colonial history and common language is very important, as it raises the 
expected number of M&As by 120 and 76 percent, respectively. For the Active 
Group, in contrast to the Passive Group, sharing a common border is less important. 
Note that this effect provides some support for the jumping argument as sharing a 
common border decreases the expected number of counts by 11 percent. Given that a 
country is active in cross-border M&A activity, this suggests that there is an incentive 
to create some distance between acquiring and target country.  
 
Table 5 Comparison between M&A and trade estimates 
 Cross-border M&A estimates 
(Active Group) 
Bilateral trade 
Estimates 
 # of deals value  
Ln(GDPacq) 0.480*** 0.347*** 0.721*** 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.631*** 0.372*** 0.732*** 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.489*** 0.139 0.154*** 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.678*** 0.342*** 0.133*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.526*** -0.285*** -0.776*** 
Common Language 0.564*** 0.400*** 0.752 
Colony 0.790*** 0.454*** 0.019 
Common Border -0.115** -0.136* 0.202 
M&A source # of deals: Table 4, baseline case; M&A source value: Brakman, Garita, et al. (2008, 
Table 2); trade source: Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, Table 3, column PPML). 
 
Elasticities for Active Group and trade discussion 
As noted above, the estimated coefficients for the Active Group of the variables 
measured in natural logarithms can be interpreted as elasticities. To compare the main 
economic forces determining cross-border M&As relative to international trade flows, 
Table 5 lists the elasticity and dummy control estimates for the number of M&As 
(baseline case, Table 4) and the bilateral trade estimates of Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006, Table 4, column PPML). Since the latter focuses on the value of trade flows, 
we also list comparable estimates for the value of cross-border M&As, based on a 
similar Zero Inflated Negative Binomial procedure as used in this paper, taken from 
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Brakman, Garita, et al. (2008, Table 2). There are some remarkable differences in the 
elasticities for trade and M&A flows.  
 First, the impact of the size of the market as measured by GDP on M&A flows is 
less pronounced when compared to trade flows. For an active acquirer, the elasticity 
for M&As is 0.48 in number of deals and 0.35 in value terms, substantially lower than 
the 0.72 elasticity for trade flows. Similarly, for an active target the elasticity for 
M&As is 0.63 in number of deals and 0.37 in value terms, also both lower than the 
0.73 elasticity for trade flows.  
 Second, the impact of the target’s market structure as measured by per capita GDP 
is more pronounced for M&A flows than for trade flows. The M&A elasticity of per 
capita GDP for an active target is 0.68 in number of deals and 0.34 in value terms, 
substantially larger than the elasticity of 0.13 for trade flows.18 
 Third, the elasticity of GDP and per capita GDP for acquirer and target is 
asymmetric. This holds for the elasticity of GDP regarding the number of M&As 
( 63.048.0 < ); compare to the elasticity for value of M&As ( 37.035.0 ≈ ) or trade 
flows ( 73.072.0 ≈ ). Similarly it holds for the elasticity of per capita GDP for number 
of M&As ( 68.049.0 < ) and value of M&As ( 34.014.0 < ); compare to the elasticity 
for trade flows ( 13.015.0 ≈ ). This asymmetry has important modelling implications 
that can be dealt with by the Bergstrand and Egger (2007) approach, as noted above.  
 Fourth, as was to be expected based on the a priori ambivalent nature of the 
relationship between M&As and distance, we find that the impact of distance is less 
pronounced for M&As than for trade flows. Other things equal, a 10 percent increase 
in distance reduces the value of trade flows by 7.8 percent19, substantially higher than 
the reduction in the number of M&As for active countries of 5.3 percent or the 
reduction in value of M&As of 2.9 percent. The different impact of distance on the 
number and value of M&As suggests that the more distant M&As are more valuable. 
 Fifth, the dummy control variables are important for determining the size of M&A 
flows, but not for the Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) trade estimates. This is in 
contrast to most other (positive and significant) trade estimates reported in the 
literature, which Santos Silva and Tenreyro attribute to their estimation procedure. 
                                                 
18 In value terms, an active acquirer’s GDP per capita is not significant, although it is important for first 
stage active – passive distinction, see Brakman, Garita, et al. (2008). 
19 This estimate is slightly below the mean effect reported in the Disdier and Head (2008) meta analysis 
of a 9 percent decline in trade flows following a 10 percent increase in distance. 
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Possibly, a zero-inflated procedure to deal with the excess zero problem for the trade 
data as used here for the M&A estimates modifies their findings in this respect. 
 
Countries of a feather flock together ..  
To summarize the above results: (i) market size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is 
more important for trade flows than for cross-border M&As, (ii) market development 
(per capita GDP) is more important for cross-border M&As than for trade flows, 
indicating that M&As are predominantly a rich-person's game, (iii) for M&As, the 
target’s market, both in size and development, is more important than the acquirer’s 
market, and (iv) the impact of distance is larger on trade flows than for M&As.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, FDI flows, such as M&As, may be both a substitute 
for trade flows (if the presence of a local production plant eliminates the need for 
(final) goods trade) or a complement to trade flows (if the local production plant is 
part of a fragmentation process with intricately linked trade flows). Our estimates 
show that, from an empirical perspective, M&As and trade flows are complementary, 
that is if the distance between two locations increases, the expected number of M&As 
decreases. We find that the impact of distance is less pronounced for M&A flows than 
for trade flows. As such, other things equal, cross-border M&As decline less rapidly 
with distance than international trade flows. However, other things are not equal, and 
as stressed above, not only the size of the market is important but also the structure of 
this market in terms of per capita income, particularly from a target's perspective.  
 
For example, starting from a country in an active high-income region, say Switzerland 
in Western Europe, M&As decline less rapidly with distance than trade flows as long 
as we remain within this high-income region, say the distance to Germany, France, 
and the U.K. As distance increases further, bringing African and West Asian nations 
within reach, the potential target's per capita income level also falls drastically, 
making M&As unattractive and leading only to limited M&A flows, particularly since 
most bilateral connections now belong to the Passive Group. A further increase in 
distance, bringing North America, Japan or South America within reach, would 
further decrease M&A flows, except when this is sufficiently compensated by an 
increase in the target's attractiveness from a market access (size and structure) 
perspective. Consequently, there are substantial M&A flows between Western Europe 
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and North America and (in view of the above) to a lesser extent between these two 
regions and the Asian high income countries. This market similarity (countries of a 
feather) that is crucial for M&A flows allows us to understand the global pattern of 
M&As relative to trade flows, as depicted in Figure 1 and Table B.2. 
 
6 Robustness 
This section analyzes the robustness of the baseline case discussed in section 5 by 
incorporating five other variables identified in the literature that may influence M&A 
decisions. Details are available in Tables B.4 and B.5 in the appendix. 
 
US yield. There is a general consensus in the literature that high real interest rates 
hamper FDI, see Albuquerque et al. (2005) and Calvo et al. (2001). Using the 10-year 
US bond yield as a proxy, Table B.4 shows that the interest rate is not important for 
the first stage Active – Passive distinction and has a negative impact on the number of 
M&As for the Active Group, as theory predicts (a 100 basis point increase in the US 
interest rate decreases Active Group M&A activity by 10 percent).20 In this respect 
the US yield plays a similar role as the wave variables capturing the business cycle.21 
 
Stock market capitalization. The rise in FDI flows has gravitated towards larger 
equity emerging markets, bypassing many countries (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). An 
often given explanation is that a country must meet a threshold set of requirements 
(market size, accounting standards, disclosure requirements, transparency, etc.) to be 
able to attract capital. A proxy for the institutional setting is the lagged stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP, which is also a proxy for the size of the 
banking sector, as countries with underdeveloped capital markets tend to have a 
smaller financial sector.22 Table B.4 supports this suggestion. A one standard 
deviation increase in lagged stock market capitalization reduces the odds ratio for the 
passive group by 16 percent (corroborating the findings of di Giovanni, 2005). 
Similarly, for the Active Group it increases the expected number of M&As by almost 
30 percent.23 
                                                 
20 Similar results hold for a weighted average of G7 bond yields, not reported here. 
21 The wave variables are not included in the US yield column of Table B.4 to avoid multicollinearity. 
22 Source is International Finance Corporation. The lag will take care of endogeneity issues. 
23 The wave- and financial openness variables are not included in the stock market column of Table B.4 
to avoid multicollinearity.  
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Transparency. An alternative proxy for the institutional setting is the Transparency 
International index, which ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt) as an 
indicator for the business environment in an economy. As Table B.4 shows, perhaps 
surprisingly, we find no support for a positive influence of transparency on global 
M&As, neither at the first, prerequisite stage, nor at the second, size stage. Arguably, 
its impact is already captured by the financial openness variable.  
 
Black market premium. The black market premium of a country’s exchange rate can 
be interpreted both as a measure of expectations of depreciation of the local currency 
and as a rudimentary index of distortions.24 This may affect investment through 
several channels, it is (i) more attractive to hold foreign assets when a depreciation is 
expected, (ii) economic uncertainty is higher under such conditions, and (iii) for those 
who can obtain foreign exchange at the official rate, foreign capital goods are cheap 
to import. The first two points suggest a negative relationship between the black 
market premium and foreign investment, while the third point implies the opposite. 
As an indicator of distortions the black market premium is likely to be negatively 
correlated with M&As. As Table B.5 shows, at the first stage a black market premium 
makes it more likely for an acquirer to be passive and for a target to be active. At the 
second stage, the black market premium has a negative impact on the size of cross-
border M&As, both for acquirer and target (a one standard deviation increase in 
)1ln( BMP+  reduces the expected number of M&As by 19 percent for an acquirer and 
43 percent for a target).25 This suggests that the black market premium is a suitable 
indicator of unsustainable distortions in the economy. 
 
Exchange rate variability. The literature is rather mixed on the link between FDI and 
exchange rate uncertainty as volatility can both discourage FDI (Cushman, 1988) and 
produce an incentive to hedge against exchange rate shocks through foreign location 
(Aizenman, 1991). Arguably, a floating exchange rate regime creates uncertainty 
which could make developing countries loose their access to international credit 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). To test these effects we analyze the impact of exchange 
                                                 
24 This variable ranges from 1986-1999. Data is taken from the Global Development Network Growth 
database at New York University. 
25 The financial openness variables are not included in the black market premium column of Table B.5 
to avoid multicollinearity.  
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rate volatility (measured as the coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate). 
As Table B.5 shows, exchange rate volatility does not influence the first stage active – 
passive decision and has only a mild negative influence on the number of M&As for 
active observations (a one standard deviation increase decreases the expected number 
of M&As by only 7 percent).  
 
Summary. To summarize the above findings and the overall results of Tables B.4 and 
B.5, we note that at the first (logit) stage the lagged stock market value for the 
acquirer and natural logarithm of the black market premium for both acquirer and 
target are significant influences on the active – passive decision. In these cases, 
however, the financial openness variable has been dropped from the analysis to avoid 
multicollineariy problems, such that these explanations can be viewed as substitutes. 
Similarly, in the second (negative binomial) stage, we note that the US yield, lagged 
stock market value for the acquirer and the black market premium for the acquirer and 
target are significant, but either the wave variables or the financial openness variables 
have been dropped to avoid multicollineariy problems. Only the exchange rate 
variability adds some mild explanatory power to the model. In all cases there were no 
important changes in the direction, size, and significance of the main explanatory 
variables, neither for the first (logit) stage nor for the second (negative binomial) 
stage. The estimated elasticities for the Active Group, in particular, are quite robust 
regarding the impact of market size (total GDP) for acquirer and target (where the 
latter is more important than the former in all cases; the average target elasticity is 
49.061.0 > ) and the impact of distance (a 10 percent increase in distance reduces 
cross-border M&As by about 5 percent). The estimated elasticities of market structure 
(GDP per capita) are a little bit more volatile when the financial openness variables 
are excluded in view of their high correlation, although the target is again more 
important than the acquirer (the average target elasticity is 55.065.0 > ).  
 
7 Surrounding-market potential, Rest of World GDP, and OECD 
Finally, we address three important issues in this section. First, regarding the impact 
of outside market potential of the target country on FDI flows, based on the recent 
work of Blonigen et al. (2007). Second, regarding the impact of the Rest Of World 
(ROW) GDP, that is total world income excluding acquiring and target nation, on FDI 
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flows, based on the recent work of Bergstrand and Egger (2007). Third, regarding the 
impact of selection bias on the estimated coefficients and elasticities.  
 
Table 6 Zero-inflated negative binomial estimates; Surrounding market potential 
 
Active observations 
(negative binomial) 
Passive observations 
(logit) 
 Number Value Number Value 
Ln(GDPacq) 0.314*** 0.269*** -0.471*** -0.650*** 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.345*** 0.160*** -0.563*** -0.668*** 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.447** 0.252** -1.299*** -1.497*** 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.589*** 0.410*** -0.317** -0.690*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.460*** -0.260*** 0.951*** 0.915*** 
Ln(Surr. markettar) -0.713*** -0.284*** 0.487*** 0.784*** 
Fin. Openacq -0.015 0.050** -0.168*** -0.122*** 
Fin. Opentar 0.031 0.009 -0.081* -0.058*** 
Wave1 (coef × 100) 0.024*** 0.008   
Wave2 (coef × 100) 0.021*** 0.024***   
Common Language 0.241** 0.411*** -0.838*** -0.831*** 
Colony 0.673*** 0.618*** -1.107*** -1.135*** 
Common Border 0.034 -0.094 -0.609** -0.289*** 
# of obs 184,702 184,702   
Nonzero obs 3,012 3,012   
Dependent variable is # or value of M&As; *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
 
Surrounding market potential. Blonigen et al. (2007; BDWN) analyze inter alia the 
impact of surrounding-market potential on FDI. It is measured for country j as the 
inverse-distance-weighted GDPs of all other countries in the world, and therefore 
similar to Harris’s (1954) market potential approach while excluding the target 
country GDP. The surrounding-market potential should only affect export-platform 
M&A decisions. Target country GDP is taken up separately in the estimation 
procedure.26 Indeed, using data relative to the USA the authors’ main findings are (i) a 
clear rejection of a common coefficient of target country GDP and surrounding-
market potential and (ii) a significant negative coefficient of surrounding-market 
potential. The latter effect is contrary to expectations and current theoretical 
explanations. The authors discuss how this may be explained by border effects 
between neighbouring countries, making the largest country in the area (with the 
                                                 
26 We follow BDWN in normalizing the distance between Amsterdam and Brussels (173 km) to unity. 
This also holds for lower distances. All other distances receive a weight that declines according to 
173/dij, where dij is the distance between countries i and j.  
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smallest surrounding-market potential) the most attractive location for export-
platform FDI.  
 
Table 6 provides the estimation results for the surrounding-market potential 
specification using our M&A data and procedure, both for the number of M&As and 
their value (in constant 2005 US $). The results are similar for both cases. At the first 
(logit) stage, the target’s market size (GDP) and the target’s surrounding market 
potential work in opposite directions. The higher the target’s surrounding-market 
potential, the higher the probability that the observation belongs to the Passive Group. 
Similarly, at the second (negative binomial) stage (given that the observation belongs 
to the Active Group) the target’s market size and the target’s surrounding market 
potential work again in opposite directions. The estimated elasticity for the target’s 
surrounding-market potential is 71.0−  for the number of deals and 28.0−  for the 
value of M&As. Our findings thus support the US-based conclusions of BDWN at the 
second stage and extend them at the first stage.  
 
Table 7 Zero-inflated negative binomial estimates; GDPRest Of World  
 
Active observations 
(negative binomial) 
Passive observations 
(logit) 
 Number Value Number Value 
Ln(GDPacq) 0.220*** 0.254*** -0.752*** -0.666*** 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.676*** 0.170*** -0.163** -0.706*** 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.058 0.272* -1.748*** -1.360*** 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.718*** 0.365*** 0.358*** -0.476*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.439*** -0.241*** 0.924*** 0.781*** 
Ln(GDPROW) 0.032 -0.878** 0.335 -1.220*** 
Fin. Openacq -0.008 0.058** -0.252*** -0.150*** 
Fin. Opentar 0.062*** 0.006 -0.028 -0.043** 
Wave1 (coef × 100) 0.020*** 0.006   
Wave2 (coef × 100) 0.017*** 0.027***   
Common Language 0.100 0.450*** -1.456*** -0.930*** 
Colony 1.329*** 0.691*** 0.076 -1.083*** 
Common Border 0.110 -0.162 -0.257 -0.459*** 
# of obs 160,503 160,503   
Nonzero obs 2,639 2,639   
Dependent variable is # or value of M&As; *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
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Rest of World GDP. Bergstrand and Egger (2007; B&E) develop a three-factor 
general equilibrium model to explain gravity-type relationships for both international 
trade and FDI flows. One of the testable hypotheses derived from their model they 
discuss and empirically test is the relationship between FDI and GDPROW. The latter 
indicates Rest Of World GDP, that is global income excluding target and acquiring 
nation income levels (not weighted by distance). Their model predicts a negative 
relationship between FDI and GDPROW if the sum of target and acquiring nation GDP 
is smaller than GDPROW (which is the case for any combination of countries). Using 
data for 17 OECD countries, they find empirical support for their hypothesis.  
 
Table 7 provides the estimation results for the GDPROW specification using our M&A 
data and procedure, both for the number of M&As and their value. Contrary to the 
findings of B&E, the impact of GDPROW is not significant for determining the number 
of cross-border M&As, neither at the first stage nor at the second stage. When we 
(like B&E) analyze the value of M&As, however, things change and the impact of 
GDPROW becomes richer than analyzed by B&E. At the first (logit) stage GDPROW has 
a negative impact on the likelihood of a passive observation. Thus, other things equal, 
the bigger the economy of the rest of the world the larger the probability an 
observation belongs to the Active Group. At the second (negative binomial) stage, 
thus given that the observation belongs to the Active Group, the impact of GDPROW 
on the size of cross-border M&As is negative (elasticity of 88.0− ), similar to the 
impact found by B&E. These results thus provide some support for the B&E findings 
in value terms (enriched by an opposite effect of the size of the global economy at the 
first stage on the probability of being active).  
 
Sample selection. Data restrictions has prompted most previous studies FDI studies 
using the gravity analysis to focus on a small set of countries. Most studies have an 
American perspective relative to one or a limited number of (high income) other 
countries or at best analyze cross-border bilateral FDI for the OECD countries over an 
11 year period, see Table 1 for details. Our results are generally hard to compare 
directly with these previous studies, not only because we analyze cross-border M&As, 
which are an important subset of cross-border FDI, but also because we focus on 
M&A flows rather than FDI stocks. In this sub-section we analyze selection bias 
created when restricting attention to a limited set of more easily available data by 
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listing the estimation results of our baseline case for all countries (Table 4 above and 
Brakman, Garita et al., 2008) and when restricting attention only to the OECD 
countries, both for number of deals and value of M&As.  
 
Table 8 Zero-inflated negative binomial estimates; All and OECD 
a. Active observations (negative binomial) 
 Number of deals Value of deals 
 All OECD All OECD 
Ln(GDPacq) 0.480*** 0.606*** 0.347*** 0.480*** 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.631*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.281*** 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.489*** 0.159 0.139 0.074 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.678*** 2.078*** 0.342*** 2.105*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.526*** -0.485*** -0.285*** -0.333*** 
Fin. Openacq 0.072*** -0.032 0.055*** -0.109 
Fin. Opentar 0.062** 0.093* 0.028 0.073 
Wave1 (coef × 100) 0.20*** -0.001 0.010** -0.005 
Wave2 (coef × 100) 0.06*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 
Common Language 0.564*** 0.391*** 0.400*** 0.454*** 
Colony 0.79*** 0.975*** 0.454*** 0.708*** 
Common Border -0.115** -0.367*** -0.136* -0.354** 
b. Passive observations (logit) 
Ln(GDPacq) -0.498*** 0.171 -0.680*** -0.624*** 
Ln(GDPtar) -0.375*** -1.161*** -0.708*** -0.552*** 
Ln(GDPpcacq) -1.267*** -7.665*** -1.354*** -2.254*** 
Ln(GDPpctar) -0.062 2.915* -0.601*** -0.139 
Ln(Distij) 0.889*** 1.195*** 0.787*** 0.664*** 
Fin. Openacq -0.148*** -0.716*** -0.161*** -0.138* 
Fin. Opentar -0.062** 0.337 -0.072*** -0.069 
Common Language -1.129*** -16.618 -1.143*** -0.469** 
Colony -0.963*** -1.223 -1.022*** -1.704*** 
Common Border -1.536*** -15.075 -0.441*** 0.159 
# of obs 255,468 2,981 255,468 2,981 
Nonzero obs 5,290 1,461 5,290 1,461 
Dependent variable is # or value of M&As; source for # of deals all estimates is Table 4, baseline 
column; source for value of deals all estimates is Brakman, Garita, et al. (2008, Table 2). 
 *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
 
The OECD countries fulfil most of the requirements for becoming active in cross-
border M&As (generally high GDP, high per capita GDP, financially open, etc.). The 
first thing to note when restricting attention to this group of countries is therefore the 
enormous decline in the number of zero observations (from 98 percent to 51 percent). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, many of the aspects that are relevant for passing the first 
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stage hurdle before becoming active in M&As at the global level are no longer 
important at the OECD level, particularly for the number of deals (insignificant for 
GDP of acquirer, financial openness target, common language, common colony, and 
common border). At the second stage, this holds for per capita GDP of the acquirer 
for the number of deals and some of the (size-wise) less important variables (financial 
openness and waves). The direction and significance of all main gravity type variables 
(GDP acquirer and target, per capita GDP target, distance, common language, colony, 
and common border) is robust at the second stage, although the size of the estimated 
effects and their relative impact may differ substantially. This holds in particular for 
the estimated elasticities, where at the OECD level the relative importance of market 
size for acquirer and target is reversed and the impact of the target’s per capita GDP 
becomes much more important. In contrast, the estimated elasticity for distance is 
fairly robust. In short, caution is warranted when extrapolating results obtained in 
FDI/M&A studies for a limited set of high income countries to the global level.  
 
8 Conclusions 
We analyze the economic forces underlying cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) using a large bilateral panel data set (211 countries and 20 years). The large 
share of "zero" observations provides essential information on the structure of these 
flows, which we model empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the first stage an 
observation is either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the 
(potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At the second stage the size of M&A 
flows in the Active Group are modelled using a gravity-type negative binomial model.  
 
We find that for a bilateral connection to become active in the global M&A game at 
the first stage, it is crucial to have a sufficiently high level of development as 
measured by per capita GDP or to share a common border. Other important economic 
factors for becoming active are the total size of both the acquirer’s and target’s 
market, the distance to potential targets, common language, and colonial history. 
Imposing restrictions on capital flows (exchange controls, quantitative restrictions, 
multiple exchange rates, and/or taxes) for acquirer or target is detrimental to the 
probability of engaging in M&As, but its economic importance on the size of such 
flows is fairly modest. 
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To determine the size of cross-border M&As, given that an observation belongs to the 
Active Group, market access as measured by the target’s total GDP is by far the most 
important variable (a standard deviation increase raises the expected number of counts 
by 252 percent). This result is followed by market size of the acquirer, which is 
indicative of the potential number of acquiring firms. Development levels of both 
acquirer and target as measured by GDP per capita are also important, followed by the 
distance between acquirer and target. Mutual knowledge of each other's markets (i.e. 
lower costs of interaction), as measured by a common colonial history and common 
language, is also important since it increases the expected number of M&As by 120 
and 76 percent, respectively. In relation to the economic impact of “financial 
openness” and the wave variables, we once again find a positively significant but 
modest effect.  
 
When comparing estimated elasticities for trade flows and M&As we find: (i) market 
size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is more important for trade flows than for 
cross-border M&As, (ii) market development (per capita GDP) is more important for 
cross-border M&As than for trade flows, indicating that M&As are predominantly a 
rich-person's game, (iii) for M&As, the target’s market, both in size and development, 
is more important than the acquirer’s market, and (iv) the impact of distance is larger 
on trade flows than for M&As.  
 
Our estimates on the direction, size, and significance of the main variables are robust 
at both the first and second stage of the procedure for alternative specifications, 
incorporating lagged stock market value, black market premium, real interest rates, 
transparency, and exchange rate variability. We provide additional support and extend 
the recent results of Blonigen et al. (2007; BDWN) and Bergstrand and Egger (2007; 
B&E). Using US-based data BDWN find a negative elasticity of surrounding-market 
potential on the value of FDI. We corroborate their findings using our global M&A 
data at the second (active) stage, both for the number of deals and their value. In 
addition, we extend their results at the first stage of our procedure as we find that a 
larger surrounding-market potential increases the probability for an observation to 
belong to the Passive Group. Similarly, using OECD-based data B&E find a negative 
elasticity of Rest of World GDP on the value of FDI. Using our global M&A data, we 
partially corroborate their findings as we find a similar negative elasticity at the 
Countries of a feather flock together: M&As in the global economy 
32 
second (active) stage for the value of M&As, but no significant effect for the number 
of deals. Again, we extend their results at the first stage of our procedure for the value 
of M&As as we find that a higher value for Rest of World GDP decreases the 
probability that an observation belongs to the Passive Group.  
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Appendix A  Main variables 
1. Black market premium: indication (%) of the black market premium for a currency 
2. Colony: a binary variable which equals one if country i ever colonized country j or 
vice versa, and zero otherwise. 
3. Common border: a binary variable which equals one if country i and country j are 
neighbours with a common physical boundary, and zero otherwise. 
4. Common language: a binary variable which equals one if country i and country j 
share a common language, and zero otherwise. 
5. Distance: the distance (in km) between country i’s and country j’s capitals. 
6. Exchange rate variability: coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate. 
7. Financial openness: captured by the Chinn-Ito index. This index ranges from -3 
(least financially open) to 3 (most financially open) 
8. GDP: Countrywide income levels, measured in million 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
9. GDP per capita: income level per capita, measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
10. Mergers and Acquisitions: a count variable indicating the number of cross-border 
M&As acquired by firms from country i in country j in a year. 
11. US yield: the yield on long term US bonds 
12. Stock market capitalization: Stock market capitalization / GDP 
13. Transparency: the Transparency International Index ranging from 0 (most 
corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). 
14. Wave: a count variable indicating the global number of cross-border M&As in the 
previous year (wave1) or the previous two years (wave2). 
 
Data sources 
 Mergers and Acquisitions data are derived from Thomson One Banker. 
 GDP and GDP per capita data are taken from Angus Maddison (2007), World 
population, GDP, and per capita GDP, August 2007 version, Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net). 
 Distance, Language, Common Border and Colony are taken from CEPII. 
 The yield on long term US bonds is taken from DataStream. 
 Black Market Premium and Stock Market Capitalization are from New York 
University Development Research Institute (http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri). 
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Appendix B  Tables 
Table B.1 List of countries in M&A sample
AFGHANISTAN DOMINICAN REP LIBYA SAN MARINO
ALBANIA ECUADOR LIECHTENSTEIN SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
ALGERIA EGYPT LITHUANIA SAUDI ARABIA
AMERICAN SAMOA EL SALVADOR LUXEMBOURG SENEGAL
ANDORRA EQUAT GUINEA MACAO SERBIA & MONTENEGRO
ANGOLA ERITREA MACEDONIA SEYCHELLES
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ESTONIA MADAGASCAR SIERRA LEONE
ARGENTINA ETHIOPIA MALAWI SINGAPORE
ARMENIA FAEROE ISLANDS MALAYSIA SLOVAK REPUBLIC
ARUBA FIJI MALDIVES SLOVENIA
AUSTRALIA FINLAND MALI SOLOMON ISLANDS
AUSTRIA FRANCE MALTA SOMALIA
AZERBAIJAN GABON MARSHALL ISLANDS SOUTH AFRICA
BAHAMAS GAMBIA MARTINIQUE SPAIN
BAHRAIN GEORGIA MAURITANIA SRI LANKA
BANGLADESH GERMANY MAURITIUS ST KITTS AND NEVIS
BARBADOS GHANA MAYOTTE ST LUCIA
BELARUS GREECE MEXICO ST VINCENT&GRENADINES
BELGIUM GREENLAND MOLDOVA SUDAN
BELIZE GRENADA MONACO SURINAME
BENIN GUAM MONGOLIA SWAZILAND
BERMUDA GUATEMALA MOROCCO SWEDEN
BHUTAN GUINEA MOZAMBIQUE SWITZERLAND
BOLIVIA GUINEA-BISSAU MYANMAR SYRIA
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA GUYANA NAMIBIA TAIWAN
BOTSWANA HAITI NAURU TAJIKISTAN
BRAZIL HONDURAS NEPAL TANZANIA
BRUNEI HONG KONG NETHERLANDS THAILAND
BULGARIA HUNGARY NETHERLANDS ANTILLES TIMOR, EAST
BURKINA FASO ICELAND NEW CALEDONIA TOGO
BURUNDI INDIA NEW ZEALAND TONGA
CAMBODIA INDONESIA NICARAGUA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CAMEROON IRAN NIGER TUNISIA
CANADA IRAQ NIGERIA TURKEY
CAPE VERDE IRELAND NORTHERN MARIANA ISL TURKMENISTAN
CAYMAN ISLANDS ISLE OF MAN NORWAY TUVALU
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP ISRAEL OMAN UGANDA
CHAD ITALY PAKISTAN UKRAINE
CHANNEL ISLANDS JAMAICA PALAU UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
CHILE JAPAN PANAMA UNITED KINGDOM
CHINA JORDAN PAPUA NEW GUINEA UNITED STATES
COLOMBIA KAZAKHSTAN PARAGUAY URUGUAY
COMOROS KENYA PERU UZBEKISTAN
CONGO KIRIBATI PHILIPPINES VANUATU
CONGO, DEM REP / ZAIRE KOREA, NORTH POLAND VENEZUELA
COSTA RICA KOREA, SOUTH PORTUGAL VIETNAM
COTE D’IVOIRE KUWAIT PUERTO RICO VIRGIN ISLANDS US
CROATIA KYRGYZ REPUBLIC QATAR WEST BANK
CUBA LAOS ROMANIA YEMEN
CYPRUS LATVIA RUSSIA YUGOSLAVIA
CZECH REPUBLIC LEBANON RWANDA ZAMBIA
DENMARK LESOTHO SAMOA ZIMBABWE
DJIBOUTI LIBERIA  
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Table B.2 Regional distribution of cross-border M&As, 2000-2005 
a. Number of deals (% of total); shaded cells: higher than 0.5% 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 5.7 2.7 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.4 0.1 13.1 
EAP 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 
ECA 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 
EUR 2.5 1.3 3.4 26.5 2.6 0.4 9.7 0.8 0.6 47.8 
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.1 
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
NAM 3.1 1.2 0.8 11.2 2.1 0.1 12.1 0.4 0.3 31.2 
SAS 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 
SSA 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2 
sum 12.2 6.3 5.5 40.6 6.6 0.6 25.0 2.0 1.3 100 
b. Value of deals (constant 2005 $, % of total); shaded cells: higher than 0.5% 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 3.0 1.5 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 8.7 
EAP 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 
ECA 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
EUR 2.0 0.5 2.2 38.1 2.7 0.3 15.8 0.2 0.6 62.4 
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
NAM 1.8 0.4 0.4 10.5 1.2 0.0 9.9 0.1 0.1 24.3 
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 
SSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 
sum 7.1 2.9 3.5 51.3 5.0 0.4 28.6 0.4 0.9 100 
c. Ratio of value of deals to number of deals; shaded cells: higher than 1 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.7 
EAP 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 5.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 
ECA 0.7 na 0.8 0.6 na 0.2 0.4 na 1.3 0.7 
EUR 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.2 1.1 1.3 
LAC na 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 1.6 na na 0.7 
MNA 3.7 na na 6.3 na 0.4 na 0.2 0.1 2.6 
NAM 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.8 
SAS 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.3 
SSA 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 
sum 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.7 1 
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Table B.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable mean st dev min max obs 
Number of deals 0.031 0.831 0 144 882,000 
Ln(GDP) 10.34 1.92 5.05 15.95 548,940 
Ln(GDP per capita) 8.09 1.13 5.33 10.28 564,900 
Ln(GDPROW) 17.16 0.18 16.68 17.47 379,456 
Ln(Outside market potential) 13.83 0.48 12.60 15.36 427,716 
Ln(Distij) 8.69 0.86 -0.005 9.89 760,500 
Financial openness 0.15 1.56 -1.75 2.62 625,800 
Stock market capitalization 12.47 35.27 0 541.72 617,400 
US yield 0.067 0.013 0.047 0.089 882,000 
Exchange rate variability 0.36 0.71 0 10.27 574,829 
Ln(black markte premium) 2.09 1.87 -0.82 12.93 285,180 
Transparency 1.17 2.53 0 10 573,300 
Wave1 1,401 668 359 2,663 793,800 
Wave2 2,498 1,184 603 4,655 749,700 
Common language 0.19 0.39 0 1 882,000 
Colony 0.008 0.091 0 1 882,000 
Common border 0.011 0.11 0 1 882,000 
St dev = standard deviation; min = minimum; max = maximum; obs = number of observations 
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Table B.4 Augmented zero-inflated negative binomial estimates I 
 US yield Stock Market Transparency st dev 
a. Active Group, negative binomial [percent change expected count if significant]  
Ln(GDPacq) 0.481*** [162] 0.512*** [168] 0.489*** [169] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.620*** [245] 0.569*** [199] 0.629*** [256] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.779*** [118] 0.331*** [45] 0.643*** [111] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.641*** [110] 0.761*** [134] 0.530*** [85] 1.17 
Ln(Distij) -0.510*** [-35] -0.440*** [-31] -0.516*** [-36] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq 0.090*** [16]  0.051* [9] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar 0.070* [12]  0.115*** [20] 1.61 
US yield -9.208*** [-10]     
Lag SMCacq  0.006*** [27]    
Lag SMCtar  -0.00002    
Transparencyacq   0.006   
Transparencytar   0.049   
Wave1 (coef × 100)   0.20*** [12] 0.63 
Wave2 (coef × 100)   0.07*** [8] 1.24 
Common Language+ 0.545*** [72] 0.352*** [42] 0.558*** [75] 0.38 
Colony+ 0.793*** [121] 0.629*** [88] 0.788*** [120] 0.11 
Common Border+ -0.134** [-13] -0.095 -0.117  0.13 
b. Passive Group, logit [percent change odds ratio if significant] 
Ln(GDPacq) -0.467*** [-61] -0.402*** [-54] -0.499*** [-64] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) -0.398*** [-55] -0.478*** [-60] -0.386*** [-54] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) -1.157*** [-74] -1.201*** [-74] -0.882*** [-64] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) -0.013 0.237*** [-23] 0.117  1.17 
Ln(Distij) 0.892*** [114] 0.847*** [106] 0.879*** [112] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq -0.163*** [-23]  -0.248*** [-33] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar -0.101*** [-15]  -0.100** [-15] 1.61 
US yield 6.583     
Lag SMCacq   -0.005*** [-16]    
Lag SMCtar  0.001    
Transparencyacq   -0.095  2.99 
Transparencytar   -0.006  2.99 
Common Language+ -1.083*** [-66] -1.004*** [-63] -1.033*** [-65] 0.38 
Colony+ -0.940*** [-61] -1.087*** [-66] -0.948*** [-61] 0.11 
Common Border+ -1.829*** [-84] -2.066*** [-87] -1.689*** [-82] 0.13 
# of obs 282,378 291,692 197,785  
Nonzero obs 5,432 3,985 4,002  
McFadden adj. R² 0.453 0.465 0.457  
Region fixed effects yes yes yes  
Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Distij = distance between i 
and j; SMC = stock market capitalization; *, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; 
st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table B.5 Augmented zero-inflated negative binomial estimates II 
 Black Market Exchange Rates st dev 
a. Active Group, negative binomial [percent change expected count if significant] 
Ln(GDPacq) 0.522*** [165] 0.464*** [152] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) 0.587*** [200] 0.607*** [236] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) 0.603*** [102] 0.431*** [66] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.652*** [114] 0.654*** [115] 1.17 
Ln(Distij) -0.481*** [-35] -0.540*** [-37] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq   0.048*** [8] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar   0.088*** [15] 1.61 
Ln(1+BMPacq) -0.115*** [-19]    
Ln(1+BMPtar) -0.307*** [-43]    
Exchange rate var.   -0.104* [7]  
Wave1 (coef × 100) 0.30*** [18] 0.20*** [11] 0.63 
Wave2 (coef × 100) 0.08*** [7] 0.10*** [14] 1.24 
Common Language+ 0.409*** [51] 0.591*** [81] 0.38 
Colony+ 0.941*** [156] 0.758*** [113] 0.11 
Common Border+ -0.231*** [-21] -0.197*** [-18] 0.13 
b. Passive Group, logit [percent change odds ratio if significant] 
Ln(GDPacq) -0.518*** [-62] -0.443*** [-59] 1.99 
Ln(GDPtar) -0.493*** [-60] -0.402*** [-55] 1.99 
Ln(GDPpcacq) -1.431*** [-81] -1.180*** [-75] 1.17 
Ln(GDPpctar) 0.018  -0.023  1.17 
Ln(Distij) 0.899*** [123] 0.950*** [125] 0.85 
Fin. Openacq   -0.192*** [-27] 1.61 
Fin. Opentar   -0.058  1.61 
Ln(BMPacq) 0.279*** [67]    
Ln(BMPtar) -0.360*** [-49]    
Exchange rate var.   0.008   
Common Language+ -1.392*** [-75] -1.098*** [-67] 0.38 
Colony+ -0.711** [-51] -1.14*** [-68] 0.11 
Common Border+ -1.854*** [-84] -1.544*** [-78] 0.13 
# of obs 94,182 211,256  
Nonzero obs 2,595 3,921  
McFadden adj. R² 0.443 0.462  
Region fixed effects yes yes  
Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Distij = distance between 
i and j; BMP = black market premium; *, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; 
st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1. 
 
 
